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ABSTRACT 
 
In recent years financing through the creation of an independent project company or financing by 
non-recourse debt has become an important part of corporate decisions. Shah and Thakor (JET, 
1987) argue that project financing can be optimal when asymmetric information exists between firm's 
insiders and market participants. In contrast to that paper, we provide an asymmetric information 
argument for project financing without relying on corporate taxes, costly information production or 
an assumption that firms have the same mean of return. In addition, the model generates new 
predictions regarding asset securitization. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Existing literature studies the effect of asymmetric information on many aspects of debt financing including 
debt maturity and seniority, collateral, liquidation rights, convertible debt, income bonds and sinking funds.1 Less is 
known about the effect of asymmetric information on firms' incentive to issue non-recourse debt. The intention of this 
paper is to shed new light on this issue. 
 
Project financing (non-recourse debt) differs from corporate financing in two ways: 1) the creditors do not 
have a claim on the profit from other projects if the project fails while corporate financing gives this right to the 
investors and; 2) it typically has priority on the cash flows from the project over any corporate claims. In recent years 
financing through the creation of an independent project company or financing by non-recourse debt has become an 
important part of corporate financing decisions. For example, Esty (2003, 2004) reports that total project-financed 
investments have grown from less than $10 billion per year in the late 1980s to more than $100 billion per year in 
2001-2003. Within the United States, firms financed $68 billion in capital expenditures through project companies in 
2001, approximately twice the amount raised in initial public offerings (IPOs) or invested by venture capital firms. 
 
Existing literature suggests several explanations for project financing. Most of this literature is based on 
agency or moral hazard problems.2 This literature usually assumes that a firm's insiders and investors have the same 
information at the beginning of the project. However, Flyvbjerg, Holm and Buhl (2002) found that the costs of most 
large infrastructure projects are underestimated. The authors argue that project initiators almost always provide 
misinformation. This suggest that there exists asymmetric information between insiders and outsiders. Similar 
conclusions can be found in Mao (1982), Merrow, McDonnell and Arguden (1988) and Miller and Lessard (2000). 
Also, the free cash flow and underinvestment problem arguments usually predict that project financing enhances 
performance. Some authors show that large projects often fail and argue that this is not consistent with "pure" agency 
explanations (see, among others, Flyvbjerg et al. (2002) and Vilanova (2006)). Recent examples include EuroDisney 
and Eurotunnel which appeared to be structured to mitigate agency problems. Many other large projects have 
experienced financial distress (Iridium, Globalstar, Passific Crossing Cables, etc.).3 
                                                     
1See, for example, Allen and Gale (1992), Bester (1987), Diamond (1991a,b), Flannery (1986), Houston and Verkamataran (1994), 
Kim (1990), Stein (1992), Wu (1993) and a review by Allen and Winton (1995). 
2Kensinger and Martin (1988), Esty (2003, 2004), Finnerty (1996), Grinblatt and Titman (2003), Chemmanur and John (1996), 
John and John (1991). 
3For additional evidence on project financing see, for example, Finnerty (1996). 
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The present paper is based on asymmetric information between insiders and market participants. The extent 
to which the asymmetric information approach can be used to analyze project financing depends on many factors 
which are responsible for risk and uncertainty. These include technology transparency, availability of licensing 
documents and other contracts, etc. In some industries, such as power generation, technological risks are relatively 
small (Chen, Kinsinger and Martin, 1989). However, large projects have many other aspects of risk including political 
risk, regulatory risk, country risk, etc. It is noteworthy to mention, for instance, Calpine Corporation (power company) 
which was recently reorganized under Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code (this project is described in Esty, 2001). 
While a risky or uncertain environment does not represent per se a sufficient condition for asymmetric information, it 
definitely increases the probability of this situation and its potential extent. Flyvbjerg, et al (2002) suggests a number 
of policy applications including legislative and adminstrative control that can reduce asymmetric information 
problems. However, these options are not always available or efficient. 
 
In Myers and Majluf's (1984) pecking-order theory the underinvestment problem occurs because of 
asymmetric information about the value of both assets-in-place and the investment project. The authors provide an 
intuition that the underinvestment problem can be resolved by a spin-off project company. However, in this setting, a 
potential spin-off cannot resolve the adverse selection problem or the underpricing problem, which arises in the 
pooling equilibrium. In the present paper we focus not on the underinvestment problem (investments are always 
efficient in our model) but on the adverse selection problem, the resulting misvaluation of firms, and the existence of 
equilibria resolving or mitigating this problem. Esty (2004) noticed that Myers and Majluf's (1984) insight cannot 
explain the nature of project financing or financing by non-recourse debt as compared, for instance, with standard 
senior debt which would have the same effect on the underinvestment problem. 
 
Shah and Thakor (1987) analyze optimal financing in the presence of corporate taxation. In their model 
projects have the same mean of return, the owners have private information about risk and investors may acquire 
(costly) information about the parameters of firms' risks. If the benefits from information production are relatively 
high project financing is optimal because the cost of screening a separately incorporated project is low. Alternatively, 
project financing can result in higher leverage and provide greater tax benefits. This is because, under corporate 
financing, leverage is below the optimal level. In the absence of bankruptcy costs the first-best financing method is 
"pure" debt. However, firms reduce leverage in order to provide a credible signal about risk. 
 
Note that in many cases projects are located in different states or countries, they are very long term, the 
corporate tax rates and their dynamics may differ across the projects, and the uncertainty surrounding the real tax 
advantage of project financing is large. For example, recently the Venezuelan government increased the corporate tax 
rate from 34 to 50%. In addition, it introduced a new oil tax. All this seriously affected the value of claims issued for 
the Petrozuata project (Esty, 1998). The present paper does not rely on tax considerations, transaction costs or an 
assumption that firms have the same mean of return. In contrast to Myers and Majluf (1984) and Shah and Thakor 
(1987), the firm has two projects available and must choose optimal financing for both of them. 4  Projects' 
performances are not necessarily positively correlated and the extent of asymmetry regarding different projects can be 
different. Among the reasons for this, note the following: projects can belong to different industries, projects can be 
managed by different management teams, projects can have different geographical locations including different 
countries, etc. We analyze the effect of different informational structures on firms' financing decisions. 
 
When high-profit firms have larger expected cash flows for both projects than low-profit firms a separating 
equilibrium does not exist: low-profit firms always mimic high-profit firms. However, when the extent of asymmetric 
information regarding firms' total values is relatively small and that regarding the profile of performance across the 
projects is relatively large, this equilibrium may exist.5 The following explains the main ideas behind the separating 
equilibrium. First, it is well known that in a separating equilibrium each financing strategy is chosen by the worst 
possible type of firm for that strategy (from the investor's viewpoint).6 Otherwise the firm will be mimicked by other 
                                                     
4This idea is related to literature with multidimensional signalling (see, for example, Chen (1997), Gertner, Gibbons and Sharfstein 
(1988), Grinblatt and Hwang (1989), Miglo (2007)). 
5In Miglo and Zenkevich (2006) and Miglo (2007) the order of different types of firms may change over time but not across the 
projects. 
6Brennan and Kraus (1987). 
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firms which will benefit from the overvaluation of issued securities. The value of corporate claims depends on the 
firm's total value and not on the profile of performance across the projects and the value of non-recourse debt relies on 
the expected performance of the project. If a firm with a high overall value issues corporate debt it will be mimicked 
because of the high value of this claim. However, if this firm issues non-recourse debt to finance the project with lower 
expected performance than that of other types of firms, and if the amount of investment in this project is sufficiently 
large, a separating equilibrium may exist. The adverse selection effect in valuing non--recourse debt may be larger 
than that of corporate claims issued for other projects. This may prevent firms with low overall values from 
mimicking. We also analyze the pooling equilibrium. We show that pooling with corporate debt minimizes mispricing 
if the asymmetry of information is uniformly distributed across the projects. However, if one of the projects contains 
less asymmetry than another the pooling equilibrium which minimizes mispricing may be issuing non-recourse debt 
for this project. 
 
The model's results are consistent with some important phenomena surrounding non-recourse debt such as 
the high leverage in project financing and the high risk of projects financed by non-recourse debt. In addition, the 
paper generates some new predictions regarding the link between the structure of asymmetric information between 
firms' insiders and market participants and the choice between corporate debt and non-recourse debt. For example, we 
argue that: financing by non-recourse debt is more probable when the extent of asymmetric information regarding 
firms' total values is small enough and that regarding performance profiles across the projects is large enough; the 
quality of firms issuing at least one claim without recourse is higher than that of firms issuing only corporate claims; 
when the asymmetry regarding firms values is large then issuing corporate claims is more probable if the asymmetry is 
uniformly distributed across the projects, and non-recourse debt must be issued if the asymmetry is not uniformly 
distributed. We discuss different strategies for testing these predictions. We also discuss the opportunities to apply the 
results to debtor-in-pocession claims and asset-backed securities. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a model description. Sections 3 and 4 
analyze separating and pooling equilibria respectively. Section 5 discusses the model implications. The conclusion is 
presented in Section 6. 
 
MODEL 
 
Consider a firm with two investment projects available indexed by 1,2=i . In project i  an amount ik  
must be invested. Each project can be either successful or unsuccessful. There are two types of firms: for type g  
firms the probability of success for project i  equals giθ  and for firm b  it is biθ . The cash flow of type bgx ,=  
from project i  is denoted by xic . In the case of success 1=xic , otherwise 0=xic . Total expected cash flow for 
type x  over both projects is then 21= xxxv θθ + . We assume the θ 's are restricted to the interval ( ],1k , which 
implies that each project has a positive net present value. Let αβρ x  be the probability that α=1xc  and β=2xc  
and γρ x  be the probability that γ=21 xx cc + . We have: 21
211 = xxxx θθρρ ≡ , )(1= 21
10
xxx θθρ − , 
21
01 )(1= xxx θθρ − , 
01101 = xxx ρρρ +  and ))(1(1= 21
000
xxxx θθρρ −−≡ . We assume that the total cash flow of 
type g  first-order dominates that of type b :  
 22 > bg ρρ  (1) 
 
 00 < bg ρρ  (2) 
 
(1) and (2) obviously imply that the total value of firm g  is higher than firm b :  
 bg vv >  (3) 
 
The firm's profit is observable and verifiable. There exists universal risk-neutrality and perfect competition 
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among investors. This implies zero market profit and risk-neutral valuation for any security issued. The firm's type is 
revealed to the entrepreneur in period 0  while financing and investments take place in period 1. The firm's initial 
capital structure is 100%  equity (which all belongs to the entrepreneur). Throughout this article, we use the concept 
of Perfect-Bayesian equilibria. We also use minimal mispricing criterion to refine the equilibrium when multiple 
pooling equilibriums exist. The usage of this criterion in a game without repetition where the informed party moves 
first is quite common in existing literature.7 
 
Financing Strategies 
 
For each project firm bgx ,=  may issue debt with recourse (denote this strategy by d ) and debt without 
recourse ( n ). 
 
Strategy d . The firm raises standard corporate debt (with recourse) totaling 21 kk + . The face value of debt 
is denoted by ddF . If 1== 21 xx cc , the creditors are paid in full. If 0=1xc  and 1=2xc  or when 1=1xc  and 
0=2xc , two situations are possible. If 1<
ddF  the creditors are paid in full. Otherwise they get 1.8 
 
Strategy dn . For the first project the firm issues debt with recourse with face value dnF1  and for the second 
project the firm issues non-recourse debt with face value dnF2 . If 1=1xc  the creditors are paid in full. If 0=1xc  
and 1=2xc  two situations are possible. If 
dndn FF 121 ≥−  the creditors of project 1 are paid in full. Otherwise they 
get dnF21− . The second project creditors are paid in full if 1=2xc  and get nothing otherwise. The firm can also use 
strategy nd . This is similar to dn  except that in this case non-recourse debt will be used for the first project. 
 
Strategy nn . For the first project the firm issues non-recourse debt with face value nnF1  and for the second 
project the firm issues non-recourse debt with face value nnF2 . If 1=xic  the creditors of project i  are paid in full. 
Otherwise they get nothing. 
 
While we have chosen standard debt with recourse to model corporate financing, the model' results can also 
be interpreted in terms of other forms of corporate financing (equity for instance). The first project under strategy dn  
can be seen as the parent company (financed totally by equity) and the second project is one financed by non-recourse 
debt. All major features of project financing and corporate financing (in terms of payoffs under different scenarios) 
remain the same as in the model. Strategy dd  can be seen as one project being financed by non-recourse debt and the 
parent company is financed by non-secure corporate debt (such as the case when the parent company defaults but the 
project company is successful, the creditors of the parent company have no recourse to profits from the second 
project). 
 
Signalling with Different Kinds of Debt 
 
Let jstV  be the expected payoff to the entrepreneur of type s  if the strategy },,,{, nnnddnddjj ∈  is 
played and the type is perceived by the market as type t , },{, bgts ∈ . A separating equilibrium is a situation where 
                                                     
7See, for instance, Myers and Majluf (1984) or Nachman and Noe (1994). 
8Since both projects are financed by standard corporate debt there is no need to distinguish between creditors whose funds are used 
for financing project 1 or project 2. The payoff to the creditors only depends on the firm's total performance and not on the 
performance of a particular project. This can be interpreted as all creditors having claims with the same seniority. An alternative 
way of modelling this strategy is to assume that the projects are financed by different creditors which have different priority. We 
omitted this possibility for brevity given that the seniority issue is not the focus of the paper and it does not affect the main results. 
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type g  plays strategy 1j , type b  plays strategy 2j  and no type has an incentive to mimic the other type: 
 
 12
j
gg
j
gb VV ≤  (4) 
 
 21
j
bb
j
bg VV ≤  (5) 
 
Thus, it is clear that the analysis of the jstV  function is crucial. The value of 
j
stV  depends on the 
performance of type s  and the prices of issued securities. Denote the prices of securities issued by type x  under 
symmetric information with a subscript x . For instance, nnxF 1  denotes the face value of non-recourse debt for the 
first project when strategy nn  is played. Consider strategy dd . We have: if ddtF<1 , then  
 
 )(2= 2 ddts
dd
st FV −ρ  (6) 
 
and otherwise  
 
 )(1)(2= 12 ddts
dd
ts
dd
st FFV −+− ρρ  (7) 
 
Let us turn to strategy dn . If dnt
dn
t FF 211 +≤  and 
dn
tF 11≤  then  
 
 )(2= 21
2 dn
t
dn
ts
dn
st FFV −−ρ  (8) 
 
If dnt
dn
t FF 211 +≤  and 
dn
tF 1>1  then 
 
 )(1)(2= 1
10
21
2 dn
ts
dn
t
dn
ts
dn
st FFFV −+−− ρρ  (9) 
 
and if dnt
dn
t FF 21>1 +   
 
 )(1)(1)(2= 21
01
1
10
21
2 dn
t
dn
ts
dn
ts
dn
t
dn
ts
dn
st FFFFFV −−+−+−− ρρρ  (10) 
 
For strategy nn  we get the following.  
 
 )(1)(1= 2211
nn
ts
nn
ts
nn
st FFV −+− θθ  (11) 
 
 The following lemma determines the prices of issued securities under symmetric information that are 
necessary for the analysis of the jstV  function. 
Lemma 1:  If information is symmetric then, for type :,= bgx  
 
 






−+
−
+
−≥+
−+
0
210
21
0
212
1
21
1<,
1
1,
=
x
x
x
x
x
dd
x
kkkk
kkkk
F
ρ
ρ
ρ
ρ
ρ
 (12) 
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





+
−
−−−
≤+
−−
1>
1
,))(1(
1
1
,
1=
2
2
0
1
1
1221
2
2
0
1
0
1
1
xxx
xx
xxxdn
x kkkk
kkk
F
θρθ
θθ
θρρ
 (13) 
 
 1122 /= x
nn
x
dn
x kFF θ≡  (14) 
 
 222 /= x
nn
x kF θ  (15) 
 
(Proofs of all lemmas and propositions are omitted for brevity and are avilable upon request). Also note that 
nd
xF 1  and 
nd
xF 2  are omitted for brevity - their formulas mirror those for 
dn
xF 2  and 
dn
xF 1  respectively by substituting 
the parameters of the second project with those of the first one and vice versa). 
 
As one can see from Lemma 1 the values of different securities depend in different ways on the firm's 
expected performance in each period. Since each type performs differently in each project the value of securities 
issued by different types are different. To avoid mimicking, firms will issue securities which have a lower value for 
investors than if they were issued by the other type. In this sense the following remarks about Lemma 1 are useful. 
 
From (14) and (15) the non-recourse debt face value is positively linked to the amount of financing and 
negatively related to the expected performance of the project for which the debt is issued. If corporate debt is used for 
both projects, the payoff to the debtholders depends only on the total earnings 21 cc +  and thus the value of debt 
depends only on the probabilities attributed ot the firm's total earnings (equ. (12)). If strategy dn  or nd  is used the 
value of debt with recourse relies on the cross-probabilities of default in both projects or that of success in both 
projects. 
 
It follows from Lemma 1 and the definition of jstV  that 2121= kkV kk
j
ss −−+θθ , 
},,,{ nnnddnddj∈ , },{ gbs∈ . The right side shows the expected payoff of type s  under symmetric 
information: it equals the total expected cash flow minus the costs of investment which is not surprising in this 
Modigliani-Miller environment. This can be proven by substituting the prices of securities under symmetric 
information into the expressions for .jstV  
 
Lemma 2:  If 11 bg θθ ≥  and 22 bg θθ ≥  a separating equilibrium does not exist. 
 
It follows from Lemma 2 and Corollary 1 that if one type has higher performance in both periods than the 
other, a separating equilibrium does not exist: the type with higher value will always be mimicked. Thus, we consider 
the case where type b  has higher profitability in one of the projects. Without loss of generality we assume: 
 
 2211 <;> bgbg θθθθ  (16) 
 
Proposition 1:  A separating equilibrium where g  plays dd  does not exist. 
 
Proposition 1 is based on Lemma 1 and (1) and (2). An explanation for this result is as follows. Since the 
corporate debt represents a monotone claim on the firm's total cash flow and since the total cash flow of type g  
first-order dominates that of type b , a separating equilibrium is impossible (Brennan and Kraus, 1987). 
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From (16) type g  appears to have a "lemon" advantage with regard to the second project: lower profits in 
this project mean that this type of firm can capitalize on the adverse selection problem. On the other hand, in the first 
project, the "lemon" advantage belongs to type b . Generally speaking, for g  to separate from b , g  must issue 
claims with a value which depends heavily on the second-project expected performance where g  is weak. When 
asymmetric information regarding firms' total values is large, a separating equilibrium does not exist: the type with a 
low value mimics that with a high value. When asymmetric information regarding firms' total values is relatively low 
and that regarding the earnings profiles is relatively high, a separation may exist. In this case the types can be separated 
by issuing claims on the cash flow without cross pledging (at least for one project). 
 
Proposition 2:  A separating equilibrium where g  plays nd  does not exist. 
 
Proposition 2 is based on Lemma 1. An explanation for this result is as follows. Since the price of corporate 
debt depends on the value of the firm, and not just second-project-performance, g  cannot benefit from its " lemon" 
advantage in the second project. Moreover, g  will lose in the first project because of b 's " lemon" advantage. 
 
Proposition 3:  A separating equilibrium where g  plays nn  exists if and only if 
1)()(1
2
2
2
1
1
1 −≤−
g
b
g
b kk
θ
θ
θ
θ
.  
 
Consider the interpretation of Proposition 3. From (16) 22 < bg θθ  and 11 > bg θθ . Thus the condition 
1)()(1
2
2
2
1
1
1 −≤−
g
b
g
b kk
θ
θ
θ
θ
 holds if: 1) 2bθ  is sufficiently greater than 2gθ  and 2k  is sufficiently large and/or 2) 
when 1bθ  is sufficiently close to 1gθ  and 1k  is sufficiently small. It assures that an adverse selection problem 
concerning the second project (large amount of investments and uncertainty about the project's performance) where 
type g  has "lemon" advantage is more important than that concerning the first project. This makes mimicking type 
g  unattractive to type b . 
 
Now consider the separating equilibrium where g  plays dn . The intuition here is similar to that of 
Proposition 2. 
 
Proposition 4:  A separating equilibrium where g  plays dn  exists if one of the following holds: 1) 
1
1 2
2
0
1 ≤+
− gg
kk
θρ
 and 1)()
1
1(1
2
2
20
0
1 −≤−
−
−
g
b
g
b kk
θ
θ
ρ
ρ
; 2) 1>
1 2
2
0
1
gg
kk
θρ
+
−
 and 
1
12212112
21
122121
2
1
1
1
)(
1)
)(
()(1
g
ggggbbgb
gg
ggggbb
g
b kk
θ
θθθθθθθθ
θθ
θθθθθθ
θ
θ −+−
+−
−+
≤− . 
The interpretation of condition 1)()
1
1(1
2
2
20
0
1 −≤−
−
−
g
b
g
b kk
θ
θ
ρ
ρ
 is as follows. If 1
1 2
2
0
1 ≤+
− xx
kk
θρ
 then 
dn
g
dn
g FF 21>1 +  (see the proof of Lemma 1). Thus 
01 gρ−  shows the probability of solvency for type g . Also from 
(16) 22 < bg θθ  and from (2) 
00 1>1 bg ρρ −− . Thus the condition 0
0
2
2
1
1<2
g
b
g
b
ρ
ρ
θ
θ
−
−
+  holds if 2bθ  is 
sufficiently greater than 2gθ  and/or when 
01 bρ−  is sufficiently close to 
01 gρ−  and/or 1k  is sufficiently small. 
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This means that a separating equilibrium exists when the asymmetry regarding the firm's credit rating (probability of 
default in both projects) is sufficiently small while the asymmetry regarding the project (assets), for which the firm 
issues non-recourse debt, is large and/or when the amount of investment in project 2 (financed by a non-recourse debt) 
is sufficiently greater than that in project 1. The spirit of second part of Proposition 4 is similar. The asymmetry 
regarding the first project and the amount of investment in that project must be sufficiently low in order for a 
separating equilibrium to exist. This is because type b  has "lemon" advantage in the first project. 
 
Additional insights can be discovered if one consider the case kkk ≡21 = . In this case the extent of 
asymmetric information regarding different projects can be easily compared using θ . Let 21/= xxxr θθ . This ratio 
can be used to compare the profiles of project profitability. From (16) we have  
 
 bg rr >  (17) 
 The greater the difference between the firms' xr , the greater the difference between firms' profitability 
profiles across the projects. The firm's performance can be described by a pair ( xv , xr ) . The probabilities of success 
in each project are then: 
 
x
x
x
x
xx
x r
v
r
rv
++ 1
=;
1
= 21 θθ  (18) 
 
 For our purposes it is suitable to present a set of exogenous parameters describing the model as 
),,,,( krvrv bbgg . 
 
Corollary 1:  If bg rr =  a separating equilibrium does not exist. 
 
Corollary 1 follows immediately from Lemma 2. It means that if firms have the same proflies of performance 
accross the projects and differ only in their total values a separating equilibrium does not exist. 
 
Consider the interpretation of Proposition 3. Two ideas underline the analysis below. First when the 
difference between firms' total values is large enough a separating equilibrium does not exist because the type with a 
low total value will mimic the high value type. Secondly, a large difference in the firms' rates of earnings growth 
contributes to the existence of a separating equilibrium by making it possible for g  to design debt claims which will 
not be mimicked by b . To see this let us rewrite the condition in Proposition 3 as follows: 
 
 2
)(1
))((1
≥
+
++
gbg
bggb
rrv
rrrv
 (19) 
 
Corollary 2:  A separating equilibrium exists if and only if the following holds: 1) gv  is sufficiently small 
(other parameters being equal); 2) bv  is sufficiently large; 3) gr  is sufficiently large; 4) br  is sufficiently small. 
 
Corollary 2 follows directly from (19) by analyzing the partial derivatives of left side. 
 
Figure 1 illustrates Propositions 3 and 4 and Corollary 1 and 2. Here 1.6=gv , 1.5=gr , 0.96=1gθ , 
0.64=2gθ  and 0.2== 21 kk . The figure shows the values of br  and bv  for which separating equilibriums 
may exist. In the space below both thick lines ( A ) both separating equilibria (one where g  plays nn  and one 
where g  plays dn ) exist. In B  only the separating equilibrium where g  plays dn  exists. Note that for any 
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value of bv  a separating equilibrium exists if br  is low enough and for any br  a separating equilibrium exists if bv  
is high enough. In other words a separating equilibrium exists if asymmetric information about rate of earnings growth 
is more important than that concerning the firms' total values. Also note that a separating equilibrium does not exist 
when 1.5== gb rr  for any value of bv  as was discussed previously.  
 
 
Proejcts’ spread ratio 
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                                     C 
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                                                                              quality firm, bv  
 
Figure 1:  Separating Equilibria with Non-recourse Debt 
 
 
Pooling Equilibria 
 
Let jsV µ  be the expected payoff to the entrepreneur of type s  if strategy },,,{, nnnddnddjj ∈  is 
played and the market perceives the type as g  with probability µ  and respectively as type b  with probability 
µ−1 . A pooling equilibrium is a situation where both types play strategy 1j , off-equilibrium beliefs about 
observing strategy 2j  are that the type is g  with probability )( 2jµ  and for each type gbi ,∈   
 12 )2(
j
i
j
ji VV µµ ≤  (20) 
 
Consider the jsV µ  function. Denote the prices of securities when the proportion of type g  firms is µ  with 
a subscript µ . For instance, nnF 1µ  denotes the face value of non-recourse debt for the first project when the 
equilibrium is pooling with nn . Note that the case when 1=µ  corresponds to the symmetric information prices for 
type g  from the previous section and 0=µ  corresponds to the symmetric information prices for type b . 
Consider strategy dd . If ddFµ<1 , then  
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 )(2= 2 dds
dd
s FV µµ ρ −  (21) 
and otherwise  
 
 )(1)(2= 12 dds
dd
s
dd
s FFV µµµ ρρ −+−  (22) 
 
Let us turn to strategy dn . If dndn FF 21<1 µµ +  and 
dnF 1<1 µ  then  
 
 )(2= 21
2 dndn
s
dn
s FFV µµµ ρ −−  (23) 
 
If dndn FF 21<1 µµ +  and 
dnF 1>1 µ  then  
 
 )(1)(2= 1
10
21
2 dn
s
dndn
s
dn
s FFFV µµµµ ρρ −+−−  (24) 
 
and If dndn FF 21>1 µµ +   
 
 )(1)(1)(2= 21
01
1
10
21
2 dndn
s
dn
s
dndn
s
dn
s FFFFFV µµµµµµ ρρρ −−+−+−−  (25) 
 
For strategy nn  we get the following.  
 
 )(1)(1= 2211
nn
s
nn
s
nn
s FFV µµµ θθ −+−  (26) 
 
The following lemma determines the prices of issued securities that are necessary for the analysis of the jsV µ  
function. The bar will mean the average value of the parameter. For example, 111 )(1= bg θµµθθ −+ , 
000 )(1= bg ρµµρρ −+ . 
 
Lemma 4:   
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1
1
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1<
1
,
1
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0
21
1
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01
1
2
2
0
21
0
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1
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θρ
θρρ
µ kkkkk
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F dn  (28) 
 
 2222 /= θµµ kFF
nndn ≡  (29) 
 
 111 /= θµ kF
nn  (30) 
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As one can see, Lemma 1 and Lemma 4 have a lot in common. 
 
From (29) and (30) the face value of non-recourse debt is positively linked to the amount of financing and 
negatively related to the expected performance of the project. The value of debt with recourse also relies on the 
cross-probabilities of default in both projects or that of success in both projects. 
 
From Lemma 1 any claim issued by type g  has a higher value than those issued by type b . Therefore, in a 
pooling equilibrium type g  is underpriced. Thus, we will look for a pooling equilibrium which minimizes 
mispricing for type g . Let us consider the case 021 1< ρ−+ kk , 1<
1 1
1
0
21
θρ
kkk
+
−
+
 and 1<
1 2
2
0
21
θρ
kkk
+
−
+
.  
 
Other cases are omitted for brevity. They do not change the main results (the proof is available upon 
request).9 
 
Proposition 5:  Pooling with dd  minimizes mispricing if and only if 
)(1
)(1<
2
2
2
2
1
1
g
b
b
g
b
g
θ
θ
θ
θ
θ
θ
−
−
 and 
)(1
)(1<
1
1
1
1
2
2
g
b
b
g
b
g
θ
θ
θ
θ
θ
θ
−
−
. 
 
An explanation for this result is as follows. Since the price of corporate debt depends on the firm's overall 
performance, and not just the performance in one project (as in the price of non-recourse debt), it does not make sense 
to issue non-recourse debt if asymmetry is uniform: corporate debt will better. This is the case when the values of 
11/ bg θθ  and 22/ bg θθ  are close. However, if the amount of asymmetry in one project is smaller than that regarding 
the second proejct, issuing non-recourse debt for this project is beneficial. In the extreme case, when private 
information is one-dimensional, the equilibrium is pooling where the project with known profitability is financed by 
non-recourse debt and the second proejct is financed by corporate debt: by pledging earnings from the project with 
known profitability the firm mimimizes adverse selection problems in financing the second project. 
 
Figure 2 illustrates Proposition 5. Here 0.5=µ , 0.5=2bθ , 0.64=2gθ  and 0.2== 21 kk . The 
figure shows the values of 1bθ  and 1gθ  for which a pooling equilibrium with corporate debt minimizes mispricing: 
this is the space between thick lines ( B ). In this space the extent of asymmetry concerning the first project ( 11/ bg θθ
) is sufficiently close to that in the second project ( 22/ bg θθ ). In spaces A  and C  a pooling equilibrium where at 
least one project is financed by non-recourse debt minimizes mispricing. 
 
IMPLICATIONS 
 
The analysis in this paper reveals some insights about how different structures of asymmetric information 
(regarding firms' earnings potentials) between insiders and market participants affects firms' incentives to issue 
non-recourse debt versus standard debt with recourse. 
 
 
 
  
                                                     
9Also we have verified that off-equilibrium beliefs survive Cho and Kreps' (1987) intuitive criterion. 
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Figure 2:  Pooling Equilibria with Corporate Debt/Non-recourse Debt 
 
 
 
1. If the extent of asymmetric information regarding firms' total values is small enough (compared to the extent 
of asymmetric information regarding performance profiles across the projects) a separating equilibrium may 
exist. Financing both projects with standard debt with recourse will never allow the good type to signal its 
quality. However, a separating equilibrium may exist where the good type issues non-recourse debt (for at 
least one project). Proposition 4 describes separating equilibria with the most frequently observed financial 
structure involving project financing: one project (parent company) is financed by corporate claims and one 
project is financed by non-recourse debt. As follows from Proposition 4, the existence of this equilibrium is 
probable when the amount of investment financed by non-recourse debt is sufficiently large with regard to 
corporate investment. The results of Proposition 3 are similar. Also, as follows from Propositions 3 and 4, the 
uncertainty regarding the performance of projects financed by non-recourse debt is greater than that of 
projects financed by corporate debt. While a complete test of the separating equilibria and implications of 
these equilibria must be based on identifying firms with low asymmetry regarding total firm value and high 
asymmetry regarding performance profiles across the projects there exists some evidence consistent with the 
spirit of the above predictions. Brealey, Cooper and Habib (1996), Esty (2003, 2004), McGuinty (1981), and 
Nevitt (1979) argue that non-recourse debt is typically used for financing large, capital-intensive, projects 
and that the leverage ratio of project companies is typically larger than that of parent companies. Also, this is 
consistent with the evidence that project financing is usually used for financing risky projects (see for 
instance: Esty (2002, 2004), Flybjerg et al. (2003), McGuinty (1981), Merrow et al. (1988), Miller and 
Lezard (2000), and Nevitt (1979)).   
 
2. Since, in a separating equilibrium, non-recourse debt is issued by the good type (while the financing policy of 
the bad type is irrelevant) this equilibrium implies that the quality of firms issuing at least one claim without 
recourse is higher than that of firms issuing only corporate claims. The same prediction can be found in John 
and John (1991). There also exists literature that analyzes debtor-in-pocession financing (DIP) which has a 
lot in common with project financing. For example, Dahiya, John, Puri and Ramirez (2003) show that firms 
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which emerge from bankruptcy and which use DIP financing have higher quality than firms which do not use 
DIP financing.   
 
3. Several empirical predictions which have not been tested in existing literature follow from Propositions 3, 4 
and 5. The model predicts that: 1) if the extent of asymmetric information regarding firms' total values is high 
enough, a separating equilibrium does not exist, and 2) if the asymmetry is uniformly distributed across the 
projects, the pooling equilibrium which minimizes mispricing for the good type is one where both types issue 
corporate debt for both projects. However, if the asymmetry is not uniformly distributed, the equilibrium 
which minimizes mispricing is one where both types issue non-recourse debt for at least one project. This is 
implied by Proposition 5. If, on the other hand, the degree of asymmetric information is uniform across the 
projects then there is no need for project financing. 
 
The existence of separating equilibria and the issuance of non-recourse debt should more frequently be 
observed when asymmetric information regarding the profile of earnings across the projects is larger than that 
regarding the total cash flows (Corollary 2). Possible tests of this prediction will be based on the following. One can 
use the spread in analysts' valuations of firms' shares as a proxy for the extent of asymmetric information regarding the 
firms' total values. Also, firms investing in different industries or in different countries can be seen as ones with a high 
degree of asymmetric information regarding the profile of earnings across the projects. The same holds for firms 
manipulating earnings since earnings management can often be seen as a redistribution of earnings (between periods 
and projects) rather than accounting fraud (small effect on the extent of asymmetric information regarding firms' total 
values). 
 
Note that Schipper and Smith (1983) found that 72 out of 93 firms in their sample of spin-offs involved parent 
companies and subsidiaries with different industry membership (cross-industry spin-offs). Strategy nn  and dn  can 
be interpreted as involving a spin-off because they contain financing by non-recourse debt and the creation of an 
independent company respectively. Thus, Schipper and Smith's (1983) results are consistent with the spirit of the 
present paper (points (1) and (3)). In addition to point (2) note Daley, Mehrotra and Sivakumar (1997). They found 
that value creation occurs in cross-industry spin-offs due to the parent company "taking out the trash" by separating 
poor performing units. This is consistent with our separating equilibria where a firm with high overall expected 
performance creates a stand alone company for at least one of the projects and this project has high risk. 
 
The results of the paper can also be applied to asset-backed securities (ABS). Suppose that the firm can issue 
ABS to finance the first project. If the project fails then the creditors (or the holders of ABS) do not have any legal rights 
of recourse to the assets of the firm. In addition, there is a bankruptcy remoteness condition. If the parent company 
fails it cannot use the assets of the project company. Therefore, formally this debt is analogous to the case of 
non-recourse debt issued for both projects in the model. ABS are now used by many corporations as a financing 
method. The standard explanation in existing literature is that these securities exist primarily for regulatory reasons 
(for instance, banks were trying to avoid minimal capital requirements). However, recent empirical literature 
(Calomaris and Mason, 2004) argues that securitization seems to be motivated more by reasons related to efficient 
contracting. 
CONCLUSION 
 
This paper has analyzed the choice between project financing (with non-recourse debt) and corporate 
financing in situations where corporate insiders have private information about the qualities of their firms' investment 
projects. The paper explains how asymmetric information can affect firms' financing policies. The model's results are 
consistent with some important phenomena surrounding non-recourse debt such as the high leverage in project 
financing and the high risk of projects financed by non-recourse debt. Also, the model predicts that; financing by 
non-recourse debt is more probable when the extent of asymmetric information regarding firms' total values is small 
enough and that regarding performance profiles across the projects is large enough; the quality of firms issuing at least 
one claim without recourse is higher than that of firms issuing only corporate claims; when the asymmetry regarding 
firms values is large then issuing corporate claims is more probable if the asymmetry is uniformly distributed across 
the projects, and non-recourse debt must be issued if the asymmetry is not uniformly distributed. 
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